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Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are major actors in rural development 
interventions in Africa. However evaluations of their activities seldom follow the same 
procedures as government-to-government projects. Self-evaluations using participatory 
methods, complemented by financial evaluations of the projects budgets by donors tend 
to be the rule. 
In these case studies we show how evaluations fail to understand reality behind 
the scenarios created by development agents and the “hidden transcripts” used by 
peasants to protect themselves from outsiders. 
To overcome this problem and introduce a general procedure in development 
evaluations we propose the use of socio-anthropological methods. The evaluations 
would be supported by the analyses of the organizational landscape in the target region 
and of the organizational culture of the implementing organization, and by the study of 
the target rural society’s perceptions, needs, potentials for self-organization and forms 
of resistance to undesired external interventions through an ethnographic approach with 
an actors-oriented perspective. 
This will imply a coordination of efforts and a political will from the part of the 
donor agencies and of the recipient countries. The main result would be the creation of 
an international databank organized by recipient country of organizational landscapes 
and cultures, of former projects evaluations and of socio-anthropological and ethno-
agronomic case studies of rural societies. Meta-analyses of this data would also permit 
the construction of a typology of organizational settings prone to failure or success of 
development interventions under given rural societies. That new approach would 
introduce a learning process on development evaluations and policy decision-making 
towards NGOs.  
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author is a master student at Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA) of the Instituto Superior do Trabalho e 
da Empresa (ISCTE) benefiting from a research scholarship within the project mentioned above.  
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Introduction 
Development aid is now characterized by a multitude of actors and projects 
where NGOs3 play a central role. However, standard methodologies are seldom applied 
to project evaluations. 
Although almost a decade ago, Farrington & Bebbington (1994:209) mentioned 
the growing critics that “… NGOs rhetoric on participation exceeds reality. NGOs are 
self-appointed, rather than elected bodies, and control institutional resources from 
within”, not much have been done to accurately evaluate their development 
interventions and above all to change the naïve attitude towards them. 
In donor countries the NGOs lobby has been rather active in promoting the 
crystallization of the archetype image of this type of organizations as more accountable 
and cost effective than the state, less bureaucratic and with a loose central control, with 
a volunteer ethos, and prone to grass-roots action (Field-Juma, 1996:30; Cracknell, 
2000:230)4. Donors also need to maintain the myth of the moral and operational 
superiority of NGOs in order to perpetuate the development machine. 
NGOs have been pioneer in introducing a people-centred dimension in 
development, in which participatory methods of research and development became 
central. However, as Richards (1995:13-16) noted there still is a need for more “long-
term comparative studies” and what we are observing is a “bureaucratisation” of 
participatory methods, which became a king of “flag of necessity”. 
In the nineties, the NGO boom all over the world introduced heterogeneity in 
this type of organizations, and the initial ethos is now diluted in a huge sea. The 
movement towards the scaling up of these organizations and of their projects, both with 
their use as “non-profit contractors” (concept used in Sogge, 1997a) by aid agencies 
completely turned upside-down the initial characteristics of their interventions and even 
the ethos of that kind of organizations. Furthermore, northern NGOs, above all aid-
NGOs, are becoming much more similar to consultancy bureaus. Therefore, we 
considered absolutely necessary for development actions and evaluations to start with a 
clear idea of the institutional origins and history of NGOs in each country. 
Evaluation of NGOs interventions is for the reasons stated before, mainly 
ideologically driven. Cracknell (2000: 57, 281-5) tries to explain why self-evaluations5 
– that obviously are not in tune with the accountability criterion – are the rule in NGO 
projects and programmes: evaluations rather expensive for small projects, the 
confidence of the individual contributors that finance part of their activities, general 
opinion about their volunteer ethos, the supposed use of participatory monitoring and 
evaluation techniques, and the fact that their projects and programmes often lack clearly 
stated objectives and criteria of success what makes evaluation rather difficult.  
Anyway, what can be perceived and reported in a quick evaluation cannot reflect 
accurately the complex and diverse realities of people and organizations (governmental 
or non-governmental) that influence the results of any project and above all its 
sustainability. The concept of ownership and the stakeholder approach are transferring 
decision-making only to implementing organizations (governmental or civil society 
                                                 
3 - In this paper we use the concept of NGOs only referring to service organizations, and so not including 
membership organizations.  
4 - Hanlon (1991:204) about these general assumptions states “NGO workers are all too often bumbling 
amateurs who go to Mozambique for a bit of adventure, to gain experience, and perhaps to further their 
careers. They frequently totally misunderstand local conditions, and are arrogant into the bargain. By 
contrast, bilateral and multilateral aid workers can be professionals who may respond more slowly, but 
make a more intelligent contribution, which has more long-term benefit. The professionals sometimes 
show more respect for local knowledge and expertise”. 
5 - Internal evaluations conducted by NGO local or head quarters staff. 
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ones), as, in practice, omission is made towards the power bias of direct beneficiaries 
(the deprived ones) of people-centred projects. Has any “Fourth generation evaluator” 
asked by whom and how have the direct beneficiaries representatives been chosen?  
Cracknell (2000:271) pointed out “government works best in socio-cultural 
settings comprising many horizontal civic associations, that is settings where exists a 
‘civic culture’”. The opposite seams to be also true, i.e., NGOs would be more 
democratic and accountable in countries where good governance is the rule.  
Nonetheless, governmental and non-governmental organizations influence each 
other in the development “arenas”. NGOs often compete with each other for donors and 
clients, and collaboration and the search for a synergic action doesn’t seem common. 
  The organizational landscape is then the ‘ground’ where development takes 
place. An evaluator should then look beyond the project, contextualise it and try to 
understand the strategies of action of the different stakeholders that have influenced the 
course of the project. 
Current socio-anthropological critics of development interventions are rather 
acute in demythologising planned intervention as something neutral (Long & van der 
Ploeg, 1989; Hobart, 1993), but on the contrary as “arenas” (Elwert & Bierschenk, 
1988; Crehan & von Oppen, 1988; Bierschenk, 1988) where different interest groups 
fight for a stake. 
We should never forget that, as Long & van der Ploeg (1989:235) defended, 
development intervention is “big business” even for NGOs, and so “the rules of the 
game called ‘evaluation’ are conditioned more by the social interests of those involved 
in manufacturing, promoting, selling and utilizing this particular commodity than by the 
functions it is assumed to fulfil in the intervention model”. 
Projects can never be seen as independent events. Beneficiaries have a 
“historical imprint”, a kind of individual and collective memory of former projects, that 
much influences their attitudes towards each specific development intervention (Long & 
van der Ploeg, 1989:230). 
Participatory methods often undermine the reasons people may have for not 
wishing to communicate and indeed for wanting to dissimulate  – what Scott (1985) 
called the “weapons of the week” - and so possibilities of cultural miss-communication 
are considerable. Socio-anthropological studies by their nature create a context where 
mutual confidence between researcher and researched is step by step acquired, and the 
rapport that close day-to-day living in communities creates makes possible a deeper 
level of understanding about people’s lives and the interface established with external 
interventions (including the researcher itself).  
Participatory appraisals, given their intensive teamwork (not more than a week 
per village) and their research tools of visualization, transects, ranking, scoring and 
games, create a profound change in the daily life of peasants. It can be like a circus 
coming to a remote place.  
 
The approach presented in this paper is the result of a long process of learning 
that began in 1993 with the research conducted on knowledge and institutional 
interfaces in rural development interventions by the first author in Guinea-Bissau 
(Temudo, 1998) and was since 1999 much further developed through intensive 
teamwork in Mozambique (2000 and 2001) and São Tomé and Principe (2002) within 
the project mentioned above.  
Although many methodological steps and the length of the fieldwork have been 
different in these case studies there is a common approach linking them: the use of an 
actors-oriented perspective (see Long & Long, 1992), the analysis of the organizations 
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Myths and Taboos of development intervention – a case study from Guinea-Bissau 
 
“The honey they put in my ears doesn’t arrive to my mouth”  
Statement by a local peasant about development interventions 
 
Field research for this case study7 - a project intended to create a Natural Park 
named “Safeguard of the last sub-humid forests of Guinea-Bissau”  - lasted from 1993 
until 1996 (total of 22 months) and was after complemented with several short missions 
in 1999 (4 weeks), 2000 (6 weeks), 2001 (6 weeks) and 2002 (6 weeks) under the 
project mentioned above. 
Living for a long time in the “development arena” we could daily observe and 
register several indicators of the organizational culture and of the results of the projects: 
external agents and peasants perceptions and attitudes towards each others, the 
management style of the organizations, the analysis of projects proposals and reports 
confronted with on-going routine activities, the conflicts between actors arising from 
the intervention process.   
The research used a wide range of techniques from direct and participant 
observation to ECRIS. The “Enquête collective rapide d’identification des conflicts et 
des groupes stratégiques” (ECRIS), created by Olivier de Sardan e Bierschenk (1994) 
and later developed by several authors (FAO, 1997), was conducted by the researcher 
alone – not by a team -, but following its basic assumptions and analytical indicators. 
The identification of the strategic groups and of the conflicts created or 
increased by external interventions proved to be an important tool in assessing a project’ 
impact on the social fabric of a rural society. 
 
After independence in 1975 a one-party regime with a centralized economy was 
established. Development interventions in rural societies were mainly conducted 
through integrated projects heavily financed by international aid. Until 1990 the foreign 
NGOs operating in Guinea-Bissau were compelled to work in close relation with the 
state (Rudebeck, 1996:36), who in 1984 created a governmental-non-governmental 
organization – the Solidami – to better control them. 
From the beginning of the nineties, the structural adjustment measures and the 
adoption of a multi-party regime created the conditions for a NGO boom. This 
phenomenon was not specific of that country, though as Farrington et al. (1993:45) 
stated, “These adjustment related policy measures have not spared the professional 
middle class (specially civil servants), who have seen their wages decline rapidly and in 
some cases their jobs disappear. Some of this economically displaced middle class 
appears to have moved into, or created NGOs in search of new higher paying jobs. This 
strategy has been aided by the increased availability of donor funding, which facilitated 
                                                 
6 - Concept introduced by Elwert & Bierschenk (1988). The authors sustain the need to study historical 
processes of transformation of the so-called African “traditional societies” focusing on their structures of 
production and social reproduction mainly in situations of stress and/or change to better understand their 
behaviour in development interventions. 
7 - In this paper we chose only one project. However, to a full understanding of development interfaces 
geared by external intervention after independence in Cubucaré region, see Temudo (1998). To avoid 
overcharging the text with too many references we are going to quote only this work, instead of all the 
grey literature that is mentioned there. 
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the creation of new NGOs. In some measure this has been an important element of the 
recent explosion of the NGO sector”. 
Guinea-Bissau NGOs are frequently identified with one of their founding 
members that occupy the position of head officer, being common to ear: “The NGO of 
Mr …” or “The NGO of Mrs …”; something that shows a lot about their personalized 
and top-down organizational culture. 
Coming into existence in a context of political liberalization, some of them 
assumed to be in opposition to the one-party regime (although some of their members 
had previous high positions in the state apparatus, and so the political trust of the 
PAIGC), what created frictions between NGOs and the state. 
 Guinea-Bissau NGOs are mostly what Meillassoux (quoted in Geffray, 
1991:117) would call “social bodies” as they are organizations produced by a particular 
social class and whose only aim is their own reproduction. 
In the Cubucaré region external interventions since 1977 have been mainly 
influenced by the activity of the Experimental Station of Caboxanque, one research 
centre of the Department of Agricultural Research (DEPA). Since 1978 and till 1991 the 
activities of this Station have been included in the Integrated Rural Development 
Project of Caboxanque (PIC), financed by several bi- and multi-lateral aid agencies and 
some international NGOs. 
This agricultural station concentrated its activity in three main areas: research, 
rural extension and seed multiplication. 
Mid-term evaluations were rather critical mainly about mismanagement, which 
left little money for project activities, the lack of engagement of the staff who were only 
oriented towards private-for-profit activities, the lack of sustainability of several 
activities (for instance peasant associations were considered not democratic and 
accountable). Not surprisingly peasants’ own perception was rather similar (Temudo: 
1998:68-80).  
In 1991, the local NGO Action for Development (AD) was founded by about 
forty members most of who were still public servants. Its director still was (and have 
been almost since its creation) the director of DEPA8, whose international network 
connections made possible to transfer some of the activities financed by Northern 
NGOs and some material resources of PIC to this new NGO. This competition for 
project resources and the fact that the AD director was affiliated to the ruling party’s 
opposition opened a conflict between the NGO and the State.  
The project maintained the acronym and some of the activities: agriculture, 
health, support to peasant associations and training. Another project – for the support of 
peasant associations – financed by a Portuguese NGO was also transferred to AD. In 
peasants’ words, “DEPA brought forth to AD”.  
In 1993, AD and two more local NGOs begin the implementation of a project 
aiming at the creation of a natural park in Cubucaré region. The activities of these three 
projects mutually overlapped and the new PIC was turned into a kind of umbrella with 
the other two projects duplicating the funding for some actions. For this reason any 
individual project evaluation would be rather difficult to conduct. 
 The main actors of the project “Safeguard of the last sub-humid forests of 
Guinea-Bissau” should be peasant associations – created by DEPA/AD – and the NGOs 
itself. Associations leaders created under external support were considered for all 
                                                 
8 - The DEPA, at that time, suffered a re-organization and changed the name to INPA. However, as a 
consequence of structural adjustment measures, its human and material resources had been reduced to a 
minimum with full consequences in its activities. 
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purposes to be the representatives of the projects’ beneficiaries in a total disregard for 
traditional owners of the land. 
Actual interventions, even the “participatory” ones, lie on “modernization 
theory” on the believe that traditional institutions are incapable of change and need to be 
substituted through social engineering by associations. The myth of the potential of 
peasants associations in the empowerment of rural societies is generalized in 
development cooperation. However, local organizations recently created by 
superimposition of the external agents are usually not able to function effectively, and 
just when the flow of aid money ceased they run into clearly visible difficulties and 
soon stop activities. 
There are also plenty of taboos in development interventions as to traditional 
authorities and institutions and the cosmological sphere of African societies. 
In the Cubucaré region, Islamic and Animist ethnic groups share the same 
regional cosmological paradigm by which the territory is inhabited by supernatural 
entities in many ways similar to humans. Its world is organized like a country with a 
kind of a president and several chiefs of territorial divisions; its army and its guards 
located in strategic points of the frontier with others spirits’ territories. 
Through contracts with the spirits, who are the true owners of the land, the heads 
of the founding lineages of the ethnic groups that first settle in Cubucaré – the Nalu – 
obtained the right to manage all the natural resources. This contract of transference of 
power must be periodically renewed by means of certain rituals conducted by the heads 
of the founding lineages at the spirits’ shrines. 
Access to land to settle and to work, to forest’ products, to hunting and fishing 
are submitted to a request to the heads of the founding lineages and to the execution of 
certain rituals aiming to demand the spirits’ agreement. 
Each spirit’s territory is divided into three distinct areas: a sacred wood, a buffer 
zone surrounding it and the land attributed to each village for inhabiting and agriculture. 
Access to sacred woods is strictly exclusive of the members of the founding lineage and 
no resource can be collected there. In the buffer zone, the access to resources is 
restricted by an environmental sound management system. 
This local system of natural resources management has been maintained all over 
the years through a complex system of myths and taboos. Islamization of the Nalu 
ethnic group, the liberation war and the nationalization of land, and of all natural 
resources after independence, and lately the fear of the occupation of huge parcels of 
land by the urban elite have been major threats to its maintenance. Nevertheless, it was 
the NGOs project that perhaps most affected the heart of this traditional management 
system. 
 The strategy declared in the project proposal considers being compatible 
“repressive measures” (administrative and legislative) with the “full participation of the 
population in every stage of the project” (AD et al., 1992:28).  
A full range of activities was proposed: credit lines for the rehabilitation of rice 
polders (bolanhas salgadas), increase the production of fruit orchards (mainly mango) 
and of valley-swamp rice (bolanhas doces) to reduce upland rice cultivation, support the 
creation of peasant associations, support traditional fishing, promote eco-tourism, 
support health services, conduct training, develop apiculture. Nonetheless, the project 
invested most of its budget in the construction of a local office and a house for the 
project coordinator (a rather young local technician), purchase of two four-wheel 
vehicles, forests biodiversity and boundaries of the natural reserves studies conducted 
by foreign researchers, and actions of information and sensitisation towards urban 
public opinion and donors in order to promote the image of the NGOs. 
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A system of personal networks and dependencies was established between the 
project personnel and some of the peasants9 chosen by their capacity to accept and 
reproduce the rhetoric of the NGO towards foreigners - be they evaluators, researchers 
or simple visitors. The other peasants call them the projects “jesters” (djidios).  
 In the conflict created by this project it was possible to identify different 
stakeholders and different sources of conflict: 
• The Nalu ethnic group: having a secular system of natural resources management 
they did not feel the need of a project to tell them what to do; traditional land 
owners considered that NGOs and the direction of the main peasants association 
(AFC) bypassed them in the decision-making for the project approval and in the 
nomination of the forests guards that had been chosen between people of all ethnic 
groups10; the suspicion that the true aim (undeclared) of the external agents was to 
rob their spirits11.  
• The producers of upland rice considered that the project did not give them any 
training and/or material conditions to stop shifting cultivation, and that mango and 
valley swamp rice productions were not the solutions, above all because the price of 
rice increased a lot, there was no guaranty of an external market for mangoes, and 
valley swamp rice has several production constraints. 
• The guards of the forests wanted to be paid a salary and to be given uniforms and 
credentials to have their authority recognized (mostly towards the state forests 
guards that were totally corrupt). 
• Most of the local population: wanted the project coordinator to be substituted due to 
his lack of engagement in the work, the huge share his salary, and other amenities 
had in the project budget, and the arrogant attitude showed towards the peasants; 
complained about the reduced number of beneficiaries of the project activities; 
protested about the totally unfavourable credit conditions. 
 
Another stakeholder suddenly appeared – the State – trying to instrumentalise 
peasants for its own benefit, i.e., to control the aid money for natural resources 
management. This was possible because in 1994 a huge conflict arose between the 
direction of AD and the direction of the AFC – the peasants association chosen to be the 
earmarked partner of the NGOs in all their interventions in Cubucaré. This conflict 
introduced a party-political dimension to the intervention arena. 
All these conflicts lead to a peasant revolt in 1996 that slashed and burned land 
parcels to produce upland rice along the main roads (instead of 100 m inside), 
destroying the sceneries the NGOs would like to maintain for aid-donors visitors.     
The increased desacralization of nature and de-legitimisation of traditional 
authorities were the main factors creating space for an ‘open-access’ to natural 
resources.  
                                                 
9 - Peasants believe that exists one only list of beneficiaries that spreads from one project/NGO to the 
others. 
10 - Traditionally each sacred forest has someone nominated by the owner of the land to keep vigilance in 
order to control resources use. The nomination by the project of guards of all ethnic groups would seem 
rather democratic but it’s going to give outside power to people who do not have the same cosmological 
relation to the forests and whose objective is to maximize resource use.  
11 - This feeling was increased by the fact that external agents and scientists named by the project entered 
the sacred forests without any permission and without being accompanied by any representative of the 
lineage of the owner of the land. There is a generalized believe that every rich or famous person, every 
scientist and every powerful country have a spirit working for them, and that white people have the 
capacity to seduce the spirits to abandon their land and to go to live in the Occident where even they can 
be offered better living conditions.  
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The project ended in 1997 apparently because of problems between the three 
NGOs. Conflicts with beneficiaries were never detected (or valued?) by the mid-term 
external evaluation. Self-evaluations although “participatory” in rhetoric – meetings 
with representatives of the beneficiaries (named by the NGOs) – completely bypassed 
the general population critics, who was considered a group of hypocritical opportunists 
not grateful for the project common benefits. 
This project opened fissures in the still fragile system of myths and taboos that 
maintained the traditional management of natural resources by the suspicion that the 
NGOs personnel and the project researchers robbed some of the spirits owners of the 
land. Land conflicts grew in number and intensity, opening space for the “tragedy of the 
commons”. 
These inter-ethnic cleavages and tensions came to their climax after the post-
civil war elections that gave the power to a party organized in ethnic lines. The Balanta 
ethnic group has now a full control of the state apparatus, which geared at a regional 
level the breakdown of the equilibrium of the inter-ethnic relations of power with huge 
consequences in the management of natural resources. Land occupations by the Balanta 
run now unchecked, as magic protections of forests can’t be activated (Temudo & 
Schiefer, 2001).  
 This detailed case study mainly intends to illustrate how important for 
development interventions and evaluations are socio-anthropological data and methods 
of research, because only with their help we can capture the entire fabric of social 
relations that determines a project course.  
 
 
When reality doesn’t count – a case study from Mozambique 
 
Field research was conducted in Cuamba and Maúa districts of the Niassa 
province – the most forgotten one - of Mozambique from June until September 2001. 
The second author mainly conducted the characterization of the organizational 
landscape, although the conception of semi-structured interviews guidelines was in part 
the result of teamwork. Guidelines focused in three main areas: the characterization of 
each organization, the characterization of their interventions, and the characterization of 
the articulation with donors funding politics and with the others implementing 
organizations (governmental and non-governmental).  
Thirty interviews were conducted to present or previous officers of the 
organizations in study, which included seven international NGOs12, four national NGOs 
and one membership organization13 with their offices in the Cuamba city, the 
administration of the Faculty of Agronomy, the Cuamba and Maúa district 
administrators, and the Cuamba head officer of the European Union. Local state 
departments of agriculture were almost inactive and so it was impossible to find 
someone available to be interviewed. 
 Field visits to projects areas accompanying routine staff activities and also 
taking a glance at their relationship with beneficiaries were part of the research 
procedures when this was accepted by the organizations. Staff attitude towards our 
                                                 
12 - OXFAM GB; Medical Care Development International (MCDI); PSI-Health Communication and 
Social Marketing; Sweden African Group (GAS), Laical for Development; World Relief; German Agro 
Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe). 
13 - AMODER; Associação para o Desenvolvimento da Comunidade (ADC); Ajuda do Povo para o Povo 
-Vestuário (ADPP); Acção Cristã Interdemoninacional  de Saúde (ACRIS); União dos Agricultores do 
Sul do Niassa (UCASN). 
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participation in their normal work, towards our formal interview and in making reports 
accessible was considered one – but not the sole – good indicator of the organizational 
culture. Analyses of the projects proposals and reports were continuously confronted 
with field observations of results.  
 The first author conducted case studies of the agrarian societies in two territories 
(traditional chieftaincies) – Mitukue and Konhomali - located respectively in Cuamba 
and Maúa districts in order to study their “modes of transformation” as a result of civil 
war and external intervention. In the study of the livelihood systems, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in 48 households (Ethokos) in Konhomali (out of a total of 
270) and 106 households in Mitukue (out of a total of 964). 
  Both research lines were constantly nurtured by the information each author 
obtained creating a synergic action.  
 
Liberation war in Mozambique began in 1964 and lasted until 1974. With 
independence in 1975, Frelimo established a one party regime, nationalized the 
economy and initiate a socialization process of the countryside with many consequences 
in peasants’ food security. All these factors led to a disenchantment of the peasants 
whose support to Frelimo was, according to Geffray (1991), much more based on an 
anti-colonial feeling than on an understanding and adherence to its socialist project.  
 Renamo – a party created by the Rhodesian secret service – conducted a civil 
war since 1977 until 1992. In the Niassa province this war began only in 1983 in the 
Maúa district. 
 Since the mid-eighties donors began to channel growing shares of aid through 
NGOs, whose intervention at that time was directly or indirectly related to the war 
(Hanlon, 1997:31). Until the beginning of the nineties only three Mozambican NGOs 
were relevant: the Christian Council of Mozambique, the Caritas-Mozambique, and the 
Red-Cross of Mozambique (Sogge, 1997b:64).  
After the signature of the peace accord, in 1992, the funding of aid-NGOs 
increased. Donors’ pressing to work through local partners has been a major cause of 
the local NGOs plethora (Hanlon, 1997:31). 
 Sogge states that “religious congregations are the major category in 
Mozambique civil society, and possibly the most loyal and coherent one” (1997b:74), 
although doubting presently about the relevance of the concept of civil society  in this 
country (1997b:48). 
In the Northern provinces of Mozambique, the main ethnic group is the Macua, 
one of the most representative within the country. 
 Maize is the main agricultural production in this province and most of the 
inquired producers have a surplus that in some cases lasts for 2 to 3 years given to 
market constraints. After slash and burn mixed cropping is practised in upland fields 
(machambas) till complete exhaustion of the soil and then abandoned. Sunflower, 
groundnuts, beans, pigeon pea and sesame may be sold to satisfy some basic needs such 
as soap, salt and cloth and to pay taxes, school fees and medical treatments. 
 The production of vegetables and fruit (specially bananas) are mainly oriented to 
the market, being a guarantied source of cash income. The development of these 
activities is prevented mainly by lack of propagation materials but also by shortage of 
appropriate fields.   
 Tobacco and cotton (a colonial forced-crop) are produced as cash crops. Now 
the quasi-monopolistic position of some enterprises (like J.F.S. in Niassa) is allowing 
dishonest trading practices and peasants’ profits are rather low or null. 
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 Prices are rather unstable and producers are often unable to take advantage of 
seasonal price adjustments by holding on their surpluses, due to a pressing need for 
cash, the potential for losses during storage or because traders do not come regularly. 
 In fact the lack of traders means that smallholders have little choice over the 
timing and the price of their sales. Access to market or to itinerant traders seems to be 
the crucial issues impacting on incomes and traded volumes. However, most families 
are completely isolated, and their access to tertiary roads is done through trails, where in 
most cases not even bicycles are able to pass.    
 Pre and post-harvest losses are felt as major constraints. Marketing and road 
infrastructures are further bottlenecks. 
 Colonial intervention in rural societies, mainly by forced integration in the 
market economy through the production of cash crops, the socialization process after 
independence and the long war (anti-colonial and civil) generated a desaggregation 
process of the social fabric of the society. 
 Intra-extended family (Ebumba) relations of solidarity and reciprocity were 
weakened by the growing individualization of the nuclear families.   
 Since the end of the war, the number of single and divorced women with little 
children has been growing, supposedly because of the fewer number of men - that were 
killed during the armed conflict – and because of their social decline of responsibility 
towards women and their own children. General statements both by men and women 
also indicate a growing process of young women “hidden” prostitution that is conducing 
to a decline in the number of marriages and increasing divorces. Informal polygamic 
volatile relations are proliferating without the institutional framework that could protect 
women. Middle-aged and old women accuse young women of catching their husbands’ 
savings, which should be oriented towards household needs. This process is getting 
worse near cities. 
 Mutual aid, that traditionally occurred between the several nuclear families 
(ethokos) of the same Ebumba, seldom occur actually and so senior families are facing 
the same problems.  
 The poorest have smaller cropped areas located in unfertile soils – because of a 
lack of capacity to open new fields - and their houses and granaries are in a bad 
condition. This group of people is constituted mainly by alcoholics and by single, 
divorced or widow women with small children and old people that have no help from 
their families. Nevertheless, civil status and age are not clear-cut indicators of poverty; 
because there are very active, enterprising and hard workingwomen and old people who 
have a high living standard for local conditions. Some young and middle-aged couples 
suffering from chronic hunger are considered lazy by their neighbours, which can be 
assessed by the number of hours/day they work in the fields.  
 If war clearly contributed to the breakdown of social organization and to the 
erosion of social capital, Macua society has also shown a remarkable capacity for 
reconstruction and reconstitution. Our research revealed that although the seed system 
was affected by civil war, few years after it ended peasants were in general able to 
replace their stocks of traditional seed varieties through buying, gifts by family and 
friends and exchange of work by seeds14 - seed distribution during relief and emergency 
intervention were not considered relevant15. Three to five years after the peace accord 
                                                 
14 - The capacity to keep or rapidly replace the stock of germplasm of seeds of local varieties is 
considered an important indicator of the capacity for reconstruction and reconstitution of African agrarian 
societies (Temudo & Schiefer, 2001).  
15 According to the first Oxfam GB Niassa head officer, seed distribution during emergency and relief 
interventions was stopped because it was inducing imbalances in peasants’ survival strategies, and 
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peasants began to believe that the war was over, and felt confident to make long-term 
investments such as building better houses (with mud bricks instead of bamboo 
plastered with mud) and planting orchards.     
 
In Niassa province, external interventions by the state and by local and 
international NGOs seem to have been designed without any knowledge of the social 
organization and of the farming and livelihood systems of agrarian societies. Recently 
some baseline studies have been conducted by two NGOs with participatory techniques 
(ACRIS, 2001; Valente, 2001). However, several key questions have been bypassed. 
Our first surprise came when we realize the total ignorance about peasants’ 
culture, social organization and livelihood systems of high-level NGOs staff (either 
agronomists and sociologists, Mozambican or foreigners), some of which professors at 
the Faculty of Agronomy in Cuamba and working in the province for a long time. The 
work of the anthropologist Christian Geffray, although published in Mozambique, was 
totally ignored. So only blueprint projects – that could have been designed outside the 
country – implemented with a blueprint approach were conducted. 
In general base-level project personnel was the only to contact regularly with the 
peasants and there was a tendency to look down on fieldwork. So it was not surprising 
to observe the astonishment of the high-qualified NGO personnel by the fact that the 
first author went to live with the peasants. 
 Niassa is the biggest province of the country16 – about 129 000 km2 – but has a 
rather low population density. The majority of both local and international NGOs have 
their offices in the two main cities – Cuamba and Lichinga. However, many of them 
spread their activity by too many districts, increasing the difficulties of monitoring and 
evaluation and the implementation costs, not to say that sometimes it seems impossible 
to implement anything at all given the condition of the trails and the huge area attributed 
to each NGOs field worker. In spite of the bad road infrastructures being a constraint to 
rural societies endogenous and exogenous development, few interventions have been 
oriented to that.  
Another feature of intervention is its concentration in the better-off districts.   
 Nowadays, the development scene is completely determined by the political bi-
polarization that civil war brought into Mozambican society. Although Renamo party 
has won the elections in the Northern provinces, representatives of the ruling party - the 
Frelimo - govern local state administrations. So the province and district administrators 
put a lot of pressure to de-motivate NGOs of working with the “quarrelsome people” 
(conflituosos). Furthermore, they speak about projects’ outputs as they had been 
implemented by the state, and for that reason Renamo peasants also accuse some NGOs 
of being of Frelimo. So NGOs are under a political crossed fire. 
 After the civil war, external intervention have been mainly oriented towards the: 
i) distribution of seeds, ii) credit to small and mid-sized tradesmen, iii) support of 
commercialisation activities through the creation of peasant’ associations, and iv) 
resettlement of goats through peasant’s credit in animals. 
Our research revealed huge staff mobility and an absence of descriptive and 
evaluative documents about activities previously performed leading to the lack of an 
organizational memory, which compromise a learning organizational culture. No 
strategic planning was observed in any organization. Moreover, the overlapping of the 
                                                                                                                                               
inequalities among them. Oxfam staff discovered that peasants were eating improved seeds while keeping 
their own, and that some were hidden their production below their granaries.  
16 - For a comparative idea, Guinea-Bissau has an area of about 36 000 km2, and the Cubucaré region 
1000 km2. 
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NGOs intervention makes almost impossible to evaluate the outcomes and outputs of 
the different projects. 
 Even when NGOs have their projects designed through a log frame, and so 
objectives, results and means are clearly stated from the beginning, there is no baseline 
information to prove that the objectives were too ambitious, numerical results were 
impossible to prove, and some key questions were completely bypassed. Let’s give an 
example using the Oxfam17 “Food security livelihoods“ programme (Yates, 2000): 
•  “By the year 2002, at least 50% of poor people within the districts of Maúa and 
Metarica will have achieved fundamental food security …” (p.3). However nobody 
knows how many families do not attain self-sufficiency, the reasons that justify that 
phenomenon, and if the organization has resources (mainly human) to address the 
problem18; 
• To achieve this objective, “By the year 2002, production per hectare by the 
programme target group has risen at least 15-20% for maize, and 30% for sorghum, 
groundnuts and sunflower…” (p.3). This should be attained by the use of improved 
seeds and techniques (mainly sowing in rows) of production. However, improved 
varieties of these cereals have rather poor storage characteristics, and so are usually 
oriented towards market and immediate consumption, and peasants only store the 
seeds. This means that peasants have a real problem if they have a surplus and no 
conditions to sell it. Relating to groundnuts, in the studied chieftaincy of Konhomali 
these seeds were distributed without any lasting impact because field pests prevent 
its production. With sunflower the problem was worse as Oxfam bought seeds to 
Care NGO, which had a low germination power and four varieties with different 
growing cycles were mixed together.  
   
No efforts have been made by any organization to support peasants’ initiative of 
increasing and diversifying fruit production with appropriate planting materials, and to 
give them training for the adoption of improved propagation techniques like grafting 
and pruning. 
 Although in the neighbour province of Nampula some international NGOs (like 
Care and World Vision) are working on integrated protection of stored products, in 
Niassa no external efforts have been made to generate basic knowledge on local post-
harvest management and of potentials, constraints and opportunities for their 
improvement. So it seems that the most criticized approach of increasing availability in 
agricultural foodstuffs by raising production area and by the introduction of improved 
varieties (in general more susceptible to pests), instead of and intervention in the 
reduction in pre and post-harvest losses is still in move in development cooperation19. 
 For the poor people of Niassa province, food security is much dependent upon 
the existence of a stock of dried cassava to face the pre-harvest period of food shortage. 
As we stated before, dried cassava is the most susceptible product to storage pests. 
                                                 
17 - In this paper, Oxfam was chosen in examples, giving the fact that it is a rather well known Northern 
NGO, and not because its interventions or behaviour culture are worse than others organizations, which 
are certainly not.   
18 - The social problems of women, old people and alcoholics are so complex that no standard 
intervention can solve them. 
19 - Oxfam GB – Niassa Office intended to have an intervention in the reduction of pre-harvest pests. 
However the difficulties inherent to the control of big pests like elephants, monkeys and wild pigs made 
the organization to quit the idea (Oxfam, 2000:7,17). 
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Nevertheless, interventions directed to improve food security of the most deprived did 
not consider storage management as a major component of the project design20. 
In relation to the support to commercialisation through credit given to small and 
mid-sized tradesmen, NGOs succumbed to the huge pressures from governmental 
officials to include their wives and friends in the beneficiary group.  
 NGOs helped peasants associations to link directly to the big traders with whom 
they establish a contract of supplying a certain quantity of a given product (mainly 
maize and beans) at a given price. Nonetheless, the price is decided before harvest when 
the peasants have no means to predict market demand and possible maximum prices, 
but on the contrary the trader has full access to that information. So, if in bad market 
years these contracts do help peasants, when prices are high they can lose a lot of 
money. Moreover, no intervention had been made to help peasants to establish better 
contracts with the enterprise J.F.S. for the production of cotton and tobacco. 
External interventions showed no concern about environmental sustainability. 
Although the goat resettlement program was built on a traditional credit practice 
between peasants (Ovala), it is bypassing some ecological considerations of goat 
breeding which are overemphasized by traditional cropping systems. However no 
external organization has ever planned to complement that programme with 
participatory on-farm research for the introduction of alley farming with multi-purpose 
legumes. In addition the superimposed obligation of building a corral as the only 
measure to avoid the destruction of crops by goats is more a scenario than an effective 
action. So, conflicts between peasants’ are common, as goats affect food security. 
Fifty percent of the NGOs with offices in Cuamba are or were directly or 
indirectly financed by the EU, whose conditions are shaping the organizational 
landscape forcing partnerships and the creation of Mozambican organizations.  
 In general NGOs staff had a rather high salary compared to the local standard of 
living, which reduced the share available for activities with beneficiaries, created an 
artificial middle-class, and caused inflation in prices. 
 Some of the organizations refused to be interviewed, to facilitate project 
documents and evaluations, and to allow our presence in fieldwork. This could be 
considered a sign of lack of accountability. Signs of present or previous corruptions 
were also detected in some organizations21. To call someone “racist” can be used as a 
magic bullet against any foreigner – be an evaluator, a researcher or even a NGO staff 
member22 - who tries to introduce more accountable procedures. 
 In sum, external intervention may be characterized by a piecemeal approach to 
development lacking overall coherence, duplicating efforts and, in practice, completely 
bypassing rural societies most urgent needs. 
                                                 
20 - See, Oxfam GB – Niassa programme plan on food security and livelihoods for 2000-2003 (Oxfam, 
2000) funded by EU. 
21 - An example: Oxfam intervention in the Nipepe district suddenly stopped during cholera epidemic, 
because peasants accused external agents of Oxfam and MCDI (which were disinfecting wells) of 
spreading it. However, our research concluded that this attitude was a “weapon of the weak” against 
external agents behaviour. In fact, the first Oxfam head officer considered his salary too low and so 
decided to complement it with an agricultural enterprise using the organization machinery. Field workers 
then felt at ease to increase their profits through buying precious stones to Nipepe peasants and using the 
organization vehicles to transport goods to sell to them, making a disloyal competition with local 
tradesmen.     
22 - In Guinea-Bissau, the first author was called “racist” by the NGO staff, when she tried to discuss the 
problems arisen by their interface with peasants, and only the support of these ones made possible to went 
on doing research. In Mozambique, a former Oxfam GB Niassa head officer tried to define tasks for any 
employee and working rules to combat absenteeism and was accused of racism and then dismissed after a 
internal inquire.   
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 This particular case study intends to show how important it is to cross analyse 
the organizational landscape and rural societies “modes of transformation” to fully 





In recent years, a lot of effort is being put on developing participatory methods 
of designing, planning, implementing and evaluating development projects. The height 
of hypocrisy is that we all know that most African governments are not accountable, 
local NGOs are mostly emanated from the urban elites and so do not represent the poor 
or their interests, and northern aid-NGOs are becoming enterprises. On that context we 
would say as Hobart  (1995:10) that “… the postulated growth of knowledge 
concomitantly entails the possibility of increasing ignorance”. 
The study of the organizational landscape throws a great deal of light on 
significant socio-cultural, organizational and political factors that directly affect 
interventions. Simultaneously the understanding of rural societies “modes of 
transformation” can be an effective tool for the self-help and empowering approach in 
development interventions. 
The construction of a data base – of organizational landscapes, all data about 
projects, and rural societies ‘modes of transformation’- continuously updated can 
introduce an eclectic, flexible and adaptive methodological procedure and a freely 
sharing of information between all partners involved in development aid and research, 
making compatible the accountability and lesson-learning objectives of projects 
evaluation, and above all increase development effectiveness, and reduce the perverse 
effects of intervention on rural societies. Two conditions are needed: 
. A coordination of efforts and a political will from the part of the donor 
agencies and of the recipient countries; 
 . A more closed rapport between research and intervention, and the end of the 
eternal mistrust between academics and development agents.    
 Meta-analyses of the data bases can be also an important tool for the 
construction of a typology of organizational settings prone to failure or success of 
development interventions under given rural societies, and also for the creation of an 
early warning system (see Atteslander, 1995) to detect latent social conflicts and 
intervene in destabilized societies facing a process of anomie. 
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